this paper, we define net-zero as 'reducing net CO2 emissions from energy and industrial processes, after accounting for CCS, to zero' 4 . However, analyses of current pledges by individual countries, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), estimate that such action will result in warming of between 2.9 and 3.4°C (based on a 66% probability) 5 . This reveals a fundamental disjuncture between the aspiration for an equitable global transition to a netzero future and the national policy planning being carried out. This disjuncture will only be addressed by countries fully exploring the ambition levels in the Agreement, and a subsequent ratcheting up of mitigation action. To date, however, government-backed national studies exploring net-zero transitions are limited to Bhutan Furthermore, longer term planning horizons are needed to understand path dependencies 11 .
Energy system investments are often into capital intensive assets with long lifetimes, raising the risk of technological 'lock-in' 12 to system configurations that will meet 2030 or 2050 targets but which are unsuitable for achieving net-zero positions thereafter. However, most 19 stating that 'Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies'. Secondly, the pledge and review approach will allow for countries to periodically re-assess the strength of their ambition. Critical also to this reframing is the recognition that countries have divergent priorities and circumstances 13 , as per the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' 3 .
Using the example of the UK, we explore the implications of 2°C-compliant carbon budgets on the national energy system, under a range of critical uncertainties. We find that the most stringent budget, named 590 Equity and constituting ambition 'well below 2°C', results in a net-zero system before 2050, and requires stronger mitigation efforts than those currently envisaged by UK policy. The central budget cases chosen (590 Inertia / 1240 Equity) result in net-zero emissions by 2070, and again requires higher ambition than under current UK climate legislation. We conclude that strategic national energy system planning, even in the short term, requires analysis with a post-2050 time horizon that appropriately reflects global climate ambition. Furthermore, such analyses need to capture policy-relevant uncertainties, which in the case of the UK include future bioenergy availability, CCS deployment, and consumer response, including societal acceptance of increasing mitigation costs.
Critical uncertainties under a net-zero emission transition
In exploring stronger ambition over the longer term, there are a range of key uncertainties that energy transitions must explore, to understand implications for technical, economic and socio-political feasibility. Four that are critical to consider in country-scale analyses include; i) the global carbon budget and its allocation; ii) commercial availability of key energy system technologies; iii) bioenergy resource, including its use for generating 'negative' emissions;
and iv) demand levels for energy services. Their criticality is discussed below, with additional detail, including on the uncertainty ranges used, provided in Supplementary Note 1.
Concerning i), a key finding to emerge from climate modelling in the last decade is the nearlinear relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions since preindustrial times and the rise in global mean surface temperature over that same period 14, 15 . The simplicity of this relationship has proven particularly attractive at the science-policy interface where a selected global warming threshold and probability of achieving said limit can be distilled into a global CO2 emissions budget. In the latest review of carbon budget estimates, Rogelj et al. 2016 16 recommend the use of a CO2 budget range of 590-1240 Gt (from 2015 onwards) from the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report 1 , commensurate with limiting warming to 2°C with at least a 66% chance. The sizeable budget range is largely driven by uncertainty in future non-CO2 GHG emissions.
Furthermore, national level studies require an approach to share out a global emissions
budget. An extensive literature exists that considers allocation of climate mitigation from different perspectives [17] [18] [19] . A recent approach is that proposed by Raupach et al. 20 , also used in Peters et al. 21 , which applies effort sharing principles of equity (per capita basis) and inertia (current total emissions basis, also known as grandfathering) to carbon budgets. For a developed country such as the UK, equity leads to the allocation of a much more stringent, lower budget, compared to what would be achieved under inertia, based on current emissions. Within this allocation framework we implicitly assume that other countries are also pushing toward commensurate levels of ambition. The implementation of these budgets is further described in the Methods section and Supplementary Note 1.
For ii), both nuclear power and the use of fossil fuels with large-scale carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology are often shown to play key roles in decarbonisation scenarios 22 . However, their effective deployment is beset by multiple uncertainties, relating to technical feasibility, commercialisation, and public acceptability 23 . The attraction of CCS lies mainly in the potential for delaying the shift away from fossil fuel use, reducing overall transition costs. However, there has been limited progress in moving to commercial-scale deployment, with few projects having implemented the full CCS chain at scale 24 . Nuclear power also appears as a cost effective option in energy modelling exercises, but faces significant uncertainties. Plants are complex to build and highly capital intensive, with a history of cost escalations and public resistance to deployment 25, 26 .
Concerning uncertainty iii), even in strongly decarbonised futures, residual emissions from hard-to-address sectors may require a negative emissions strategy to achieve a net-zero emissions position. 87% of global IPCC AR5 scenarios with a 66% chance of staying below 2°C deploy negative emissions technologies, with bioenergy CCS (BECCS) technology being most prevalent 27 . However, the practicality of negative emissions strategies remains contested 28 .
Additionally, future bioenergy resources are likely to be constrained by biophysical and socioeconomic factors, with a wide range of estimates reflecting uncertainties around food security and diets, land use dynamics, and water use 29 .
Finally, concerning iv), uncertainty of future demands for energy services such as mobility, heating and lighting are important drivers of CO2 emission levels. Reducing such demands can be achieved via a range of mechanisms, including pricing, regulation, and information provision to influence consumer choices. A number of modelling assessments have underlined the role of price-induced demand reductions in energy services, particularly in sectors where mitigation options are limited. However, the role and impact of such a mechanism is also highly uncertain, in large part due to a limited empirical basis 30 .
CO2 pathways and budget feasibility
Implications of a net-zero transition for the UK, subject to the above uncertainties, are The analysis shows that achieving a 2°C compatible net-zero position in both Equity cases requires stronger action before 2050 than is achieved under the current UK policy case. In The 590 Equity case, however, is at the limits of feasibility. 70% of the runs for this case deploy a 'backstop' mitigation option by 2050, priced at £10,000 /tCO2 (Supplementary Figure   4) . Deployment of the backstop effectively means that the model has failed to find a solution.
In the 590 Equity case, the use of the backstop technology results from limits on the model's ability to rapidly deploy low carbon technologies in the near-term. Deployment rates are 
Emission reduction options under transition pathways
The mitigation options under different transition pathways are strongly influenced by the uncertainties described earlier.
The results demonstrate that staying within budget levels without CCS is extremely challenging, underlining the critical nature of this technology. per annum. In both Equity cases (3d and 3e), the average investment rate is higher than that observed in the Policy case, while existing fossil capacity is utilised at very low rates after 2020, as highlighted by the reduction in carbon intensity.
Finally, consumer surplus losses express, in economic terms, the reduction in energy service demands resulting from high carbon prices (Figure 3g-3i) . That is, higher prices for delivering energy services are inducing demand reductions, for example in the provision of private car mobility, aviation demand, or excess heating and lighting. Under the 590 Equity case in particular (3g), the importance of this mitigation option for the transition in the near term is obvious, as it can be affected rapidly without large scale investment or infrastructure build.
These losses plateau post-2050, as supply-side solutions become more cost-effective, and can be scaled. Again, with the exception of the 1240 Inertia case (3i), levels of demand response are higher than observed in the Policy case. 
Economic implications
Over the period 2020-2040, the costs of the system re-orientation under the 590 Equity case are between 20-30% higher than the Policy case, reaching an additional £100 billion by 2030.
Achieving this would need a massive increase in investment flows into the energy sector, and a policy package that could put the relevant market and regulatory-based incentives in place. 
Discussion
The analysis shows that pre-2050, national mitigation efforts needed to stay within Equitybased budgets (and 590 Inertia) are likely to be underestimated without a longer term perspective on the necessary emission reductions. Both Equity cases require higher rates of decarbonisation than those projected under the current UK policy framework, which is based around achieving ambitious (but not net-zero) decarbonisation targets by 2050. An important implication of this is that, given the relationship between cumulative CO2
emissions and surface temperature rise, pre-2050 emission reduction targets should be informed by the overall long term objective of limiting warming to well below 2°C. If not, there is a real risk that insufficient action is taken out to mid-century to affect a transition that stays within the available carbon budget implied by the Paris Agreement's headline goals.
We observe that the current UK policy framework locks-in a strategy that underestimates the levels of low carbon technology deployment required to meet an Equity-based carbon budget. Specifically, the role of commercially-deployed CCS appears critical. The feasibility of scaling this type of technology depends on demonstrating its commercial viability. Therefore, the UK government's decision to scrap its CCS demonstration programme in 2015 for the second time in 5 years appears short-sighted 32 . Secondly, a quicker phase out of fossil-based generation, and higher deployment of wind and nuclear power is required in the power sector. Thirdly, there is a need for more rapid and earlier reductions in emissions from the transport and building sectors. In short, the results put into sharp focus the need for a more ambitious policy package if Equity-based budget cases are to be achieved.
Our analysis suggests that under the Equity allocation approach, the UK's legislated targets would need to be strengthened to include a net-zero target no later than 2070, thereby providing a clear policy direction 33 , and to be founded on a carbon budget with at least a 66% probability of staying below 2 °C. This conclusion broadly holds for the budget case 915 Blend as described in the Supplementary Note 2 (see Supplementary Figure 3 The broader findings here are wholly relevant for decision makers across the developed world in the post-Paris Agreement era. As countries are encouraged to revisit the ambition in their NDCs, the end goal of net-zero GHG emissions can be used to guide both near and longer term strategy. The longer term objective will be feasible only with the necessary action in the short term while the carbon budget still exists within which to manoeuvre. Crucially, therefore, national climate policy analyses will need to extend their time horizons, explore stronger ambition, and effectively assess the uncertainties that are most relevant to their national circumstances.
Methods
To explore the implications of emission reductions in line with the Paris Agreement level of ambition, we perform a scenario sensitivity analysis of the UK energy system. The UK is widely regarded as being amongst the group of advanced economies which have the most ambitious goals, legislating for a legally binding 2050 GHG target 36 that has, in recent years, appeared to engender broad cross-party political support 37 . Additionally, the setting of climate targets in the UK has been informed by an evidence based process using multiple model-based analyses 38, 39 . This case study therefore explores whether a post-2050 net-zero target could necessitate a rethink of the current policy architecture, ambition level, and approach to modelling.
The UKTM model
For the analysis, we use the UK integrated energy system model, UKTM 40 . This model has been developed at the UCL Energy Institute over the last few years as a successor to the UK MARKAL model 41 . UK MARKAL was a major analytical framework used to underpin UK energy policy making and legislation from 2003 to 2013 38, 42, 43 . . This allows for some representation of peak demand, system security via a peak reserve margin, and therefore key requirements for power system operation. In addition to representing energy flows, UKTM models both energy and non-energy related CO2, CH4, N2O
and HFC emissions, although non-CO2 GHGs have not been explicitly considered in this analysis. 
Sector Description

Resources and trade (UPS)
Includes potentials and cost parameters for domestic resources and traded energy products. Fossil fuel prices are sourced from DECC projections 47 , while the assumptions on bioenegy potentials are aligned with the CCC's Bioenergy Review 48 .
Energy processing (PRC)
Covers all energy conversion processes apart from electricity generation, including oil refineries, coal processing, gas networks, hydrogen production, bioenergy processing as well as carbon capture and storage (CCS) infrastructure.
Power generation (ELC)
Represents a large variety of current and future electricity generation technologies as well as storage technologies, the transmission grid and interconnectors to continental Europe and Ireland. The technology assumptions are mostly aligned with DECC's Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM 49 ).
Residential (RES)
Domestic housing is divided into existing and new buildings with existing buildings being further differentiated along the categories of flats/houses and cavitywalls/solid-walls. In addition to a large portfolio of heating technologies for the two main energy service demands of space heating and hot water, other services like lighting, cooking and different electric appliances are represented. The technology data is mainly aligned with the National Household Model (NHM).
Services (SER)
As per the residential structure, but with the building stock divided into low-and high-consumption non-domestic buildings. The technology data is mainly aligned with the National Household Model (NHM).
Industry (IND)
Divided into 8 subsectors of which the most energy-intensive (iron & steel, cement, paper and parts of the chemicals industry) are modelled in a detailed processoriented manner 50 , while the remainder are represented by generic processes delivering the different energy services demands. Data are aligned with DECC assumptions 51 .
Transport (TRA)
Nine distinct transport modes are included (cars, buses, 2-wheelers, light goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, passenger rail, freight rail, aviation and shipping). Technology parameters for road transport are mainly sourced from work by Ricardo-AEA 52 .
Agricultural and land use (AGR)
Represents, in addition to processes for the comparatively small fuel consumption for energy services, land use and agricultural emissions as well as several mitigation options for these emissions based on work by Defra 53 .
Sensitivity analysis approach
The scenario sensitivity analysis focuses on the key set of identified system uncertaintiescarbon budget level, CCS deployment, role of nuclear, bioenergy resource level, resulting in 64 model runs (Supplementary Figure 1) . For comparison, an illustrative UK policy case has also been modelled under the same uncertainty dimensions (16 model runs), based on the current policy framework but with 2050 ambition extended to 2100.
The global carbon budget range for 2°C (66% probability) is taken from the IPCC AR5 assessment. The low and high end of the budget range, 590-1240 GtCO2, are used in the modelling. This is similar to the 1.5°C (33% probability) budget range 1 . The 1.5°C (50% probability) budget range was not analysed due to its stringency (Supplementary Figure 2) .
To allocate a share of the global budget to the UK, we use two approaches 20 -i) equity, where allocation is on an equal per-capita basis, giving the UK a 0.8% share of the budget, and ii) inertia, determined by its 2010 share of global emissions, giving the UK a 1.5%
allocation. These provide both a high and low allocation stringency respectively, and in combination with the global budget range, result in a wide spread of UK budgets for analysis, compliant with the 2°C climate objective. An additional sensitivity 915 Blend provides a central case for comparison, and is described further in Supplementary Note 2.
The budget is implemented between 2015-2100, leaving the model free to determine the timing of emissions, and the point at which net-zero is reached. To illustrate the requirement of the Paris Agreement requiring developed countries to achieve net-zero faster than other nations, we impose a constraint that net-zero must be achieved at least by 2080. The modelling approach does not however permit net negative accounting. This is so that negative emission technologies are deployed sparingly in order to deal with hard to mitigate sectors rather than at a larger scale to provide system wide flexibility and reduce the need for near term action (see Supplementary Note 2).
CO2 offsets are not permitted, meaning that the UK has to ensure all reductions are accounted for domestically. This is broadly consistent with the UK's current approach, and the guidance provided by the statutory UK climate advisors, the Committee on Climate Change 44 . While offsetting could provide a degree of flexibility in the transition, it is assumed that other countries will also be aiming for net-zero, and therefore will have limited scope for supplying offsets, with those available likely to be at high market prices.
Uncertainty regarding the role of nuclear power and CCS technology is reflected in divergent high and low cases. The high case uses constraints that are in line with current UK government assumptions. Nuclear energy can contribute a maximum of 33 GW to electricity system capacity, while CCS technologies in electricity generation, industrial CCS and hydrogen production are commercially available from 2030 onwards, with permitted annual growth at 5-10%. In the low case, the nuclear capacity is capped at 15 GW (close to the currently installed 11 GW), reflecting constraints on financing and public acceptance. In the low case for CCS, commercial availability is delayed to 2040 and the growth constraint tightened, from 10% to 5% per year.
For the UK, bioenergy resources have been shown to be the most critical uncertainty for meeting decarbonisation goals cost-effectively 54 . A high and low case have been formulated based on published bioenergy scenarios (Supplementary Note 1). The high case reflects extending land use for bioenergy, allowing bioenergy to grow to four times the current level, while the low case reflects constraints on land use and restrictions on imports.
Demand reduction resulting from changes in the price of energy services completes the scenario sensitivity set. Providing a crucial policy mitigation option in those sectors where technology-based solutions are costly, limited or exhausted, reductions in demand are accounted for as welfare losses, allowing for a system cost trade-off with supply-side options.
Low and high own-price elasticity assumptions have been used for the sensitivity range 30 .
The absolute limits of demand reduction have been set at 15% per annum in the low case and 40% per annum in the high case, versus an inelastic counterfactual for each. Reductions in demand resulting from non-price factors, such as societal change, are not represented.
Data Availability Statement: The data that support the plots within this paper and other findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
